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STATE, REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC REFORMS  
IN TIMES OF DECLINE: 
ROYAL TAXATION AND TRADE POLICY IN ARAGON (1626-1700) 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This article explores fiscal and trade policy in Aragon between 1626 and 
1700, providing a case study of economic management by regional institutions in a 
composite monarchy of the early modern period. The increasing burden and irregular 
distribution of royal taxation hastened economic decline in seventeenth century Aragon. 
Eventually, the monarchy moderated its fiscal demands in 1678-97 to alleviate the 
financial distress of the region’s towns and villages and cure the economic ills caused 
by protectionist trade policies in north-eastern Spain. The Aragonese Parliament only 
lowered royal subsidies after 1678, though it began to raise import duties as early as 
1626 to ease the pressure on heavily indebted municipal treasuries. However, 
conflicting regional interest groups undermined the Cortes’ economic policies, and their 
main effect was to drive up transaction costs without preventing French control of trade 
and manufacturing in Aragon in the second half of the seventeenth century. In contrast, 
the free-trade policies pursued by the Diputación were more consistently applied and 
enjoyed greater legal and political support, fostering export-led agricultural 
specialization from which the elites were able to profit, although they failed to deliver 
long-run economic growth.  
 
1. Introduction. 
Throughout the nineteenth century and for much of the twentieth, historians, 
sociologists and economists sought to explain Europe’s dominance over the rest of the 
world, which was believed to be rooted in the political, economic and social 
transformations wrought in the preceding centuries, and especially in the growing 
power of the state in the early modern period. Countless scholars essayed empirical 
studies at the national level, and this interest eventually materialised in the theories 
propounded by the economist Joseph Schumpeter and the sociologist Max Weber 
between 1918 and 1920 with regard to the new functions assumed by the state and its 
contribution to European history. Weber focused on political and administrative 
centralisation through the creation of a large, efficient bureaucracy supported by the 
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legal monopoly of force. Schumpeter stressed the fiscal orientation of the early modern 
state, a corollary of its hunger for funds to finance incessant military campaigning. This 
“fiscal state”, in which the realm as a whole contributed to fund the actions of the 
monarchy, gradually evolved from a system, the “domain state”, based solely on the 
resources that could be obtained from the monarch’s personal domains. Both 
Schumpeter and Weber believed not only that the fiscal state diminished the power 
wielded by the feudal aristocracy and regional or local institutions in the Middle Ages, 
but also that it fostered the transition to market economies capable of providing more 
sustained growth, underpinning the rise of capitalism and liberal government in modern 
Europe. These ideas took firm hold in Europe, favoured by state intervention in national 
economies in response to the crash of 1929 and the two world wars. Many of the 
theories proposed by historians and sociologists in 1950-75 to explain political and 
economic developments in nineteenth- and twentieth century Europe thus stressed the 
importance of political and fiscal centralisation in the early modern period, which the 
state was able to impose on both elites and institutions thanks to its growing coercive 
power.1  
However, the crucial role assigned by European historiography to the political 
centralisation of the state has been revised by sociologists and historians alike since 
1975. Taking Weber as their starting point, historical sociologists like Tilly, Mann and 
Downing sought to relate the absolutist or parliamentary structure of each state and the 
size of its bureaucracy with fiscal policies and the military pressures caused by the 
frequent strife between nations in the early modern period. Influenced by Marxism, 
Anderson argued that the absolutist state represented a reorganisation of feudalism in 
the service of the agrarian elites, and that its specific features were defined by regional 
differences in economic and social structures. Political historians and historical 
sociologists now generally accept that a gradual process of state-building took place 
between the late mediaeval and the early modern period, and numerous published works 
describe how rulers sought the political cooperation of regional elites by integrating 
their interests with those of the state. This strategy encouraged patronage and 
clientelism in appointments to public office, hindering the creation of an efficient 
bureaucracy in the exclusive service of the state.2  
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Later economic historians have revised Schumpeter’s fiscally oriented description 
of the early modern state, placing the emphasis on overall economic management. On 
this view, increasingly fierce military and trade rivalries in early modern Europe obliged 
the new state not only to tax its subjects more efficiently, but also to improve 
institutional conditions for production and trade, and to organize natural and human 
resources so as to achieve steady long-run growth.3 It was the proponents of the New 
Institutional Economics who reopened the debate, first raised by historical sociologists, 
with regard to the state structures which might have favoured this process. Where 
Weber and Tilly argued that the absolutist states taxed their subjects excessively, 
especially in the cities, North and Weingast add that the absence of institutional checks 
made them more likely to adopt economic policies that hampered growth. In contrast, 
they claim, the English revolution of 1688 not only handed Parliament power over state 
taxation but also allowed it to hold the monarchy to its commitments in matters of 
property and other rights, which greatly increased institutional control over royal 
governance in Great Britain and helped drive growth. Zanden, Buringh and Bosker have 
recently expanded this theory by linking north-western Europe’s more robust 
parliamentary systems to the region’s economic ascendancy over southern and central 
Europe. However, Epstein has argued that the key process was the concentration of 
sovereignty by the modern state in Europe. Multiple or composite sovereignties were 
constrained by the differing degrees of political control they could exercise over their 
domains, and they were less well able than the centralised state to construct an efficient 
fiscal policy without increasing transaction costs or deranging market coordination by 
usurping feudal and corporate rights.4  
Historians and economists engaging in this debate since 1975 have contrasted 
fiscal developments in England and Holland, the European states in which 
parliamentarianism is generally held to have triumphed in the early modern period, and 
in the absolutist states of France and Spain. Economic management by parliaments and 
other representative institutions was assessed in terms of the effectiveness of tax 
systems.5 This approach could be fruitfully applied to the heartlands of the state where 
absolutism or parliamentarianism took hold quickly, and to peripheral territories that 
were largely beholden to the seat of power. However, it proved problematic in other 
regions where the new absolutist and parliamentary states, and their representative 
institutions wielded only partial political and economic control.6 According to recent 
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research, regional institutions played an important mediating role even in absolute 
monarchies like France, cooperating with the State during the slow advance of political 
centralization.7 In the peripheral regions of composite monarchies like that of Spain 
they sought, with differing degrees of success, to uphold traditional political autonomy 
and keep state taxes low.8 However, the economic policies adopted by regional 
institutions have remained largely unexplored, even though their effects were 
sometimes far from local. 
This paper contributes to the debate on the political development of the state and 
economic management by regional representative institutions in early modern Europe 
by examining state taxation and trade policy in seventeenth century Aragon, an 
autonomous region forming part of the composite monarchy that was Hapsburg Spain. 
Located in the north-east of the Iberian Peninsula (see map), the Kingdom of Aragon 
was part of the Crown of Aragon, a federation of realms that coalesced in the late 
medieval period and also included Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, 
Sicily and Naples. Though it formed part of the nascent Spanish State which grew out 
of the union of the Crowns of Castile and Aragon under a single dynasty at the end of 
the fifteenth century, the Kingdom of Aragon retained its own fueros (customary laws) 
and institutions under the Hapsburg dynasty until their abolition by the new Bourbon 
monarchy in 1707. As we shall see, the region’s institutions enjoyed broader powers to 
set economic policy than any other Spanish territory of the Crown of Aragon.  
Entangled in an endless series of wars with France to defend its political 
hegemony and territorial control in Europe, the Spanish monarchy imposed a series of 
trade and tax measures in Aragon beginning in 1626. However, the state could only levy 
royal taxes with the permission of the most important of the region’s representative 
institutions, the Aragonese Parliament or Cortes. The four estamentos or estates (high 
nobility, minor nobility, church and citizens) could negotiate new laws at the Cortes and 
lay their complaints and petitions before the Spanish king. However, Parliaments were 
convened at ever longer intervals from the mid-sixteenth century onwards. This 
increased the power of the Diputación de Aragón, a standing committee of the 
Parliament formed by two representatives from each estamento, which was charged 
with day-to-day governance of the Kingdom and upholding its customary laws.  
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The regional parliaments and Diputaciones of north-eastern Spain enjoyed 
considerable autonomy in mediaeval and early modern times, and research into these 
institutions proliferated on the back of the nationalist movements which re-emerged in 
Spain at the end of the Franco dictatorship and in response to political decentralization 
by the nascent democratic regime in the 1970s and 80s. Given the extant historical and 
legal sources, scholars have tended to focus rather on the political and legislative 
functions of regional institutions than on economic management, particularly in the 
Crown of Aragon.9 As this article will show, the main tax and trade reforms enacted in 
Aragon in the seventeenth century emerged from a process of negotiation and conflict 
between the region’s representative institutions and the monarchy, which provided the 
context for intense economic debate between 1674 and 1686. Exploration of the 
contemporary fiscal and trade debate will throw light on the policies and interests of the 
Spanish State, the Aragonese Parliament and the Diputación, and on outcomes in a 
regional economy undergoing painful restructuring. Unfortunately, comparison between 
the different regions of north-eastern Spain in the seventeenth century is greatly 
complicated by the divergences between local economies and economic policies, not to 
mention the patchiness of primary and secondary sources.  Consequently, only selected 
information on Catalonia and Valencia is presented to identify common processes and 
to highlight certain idiosyncrasies in the case of Aragon.  
Overall, we may conclude that regional representative institutions in early modern 
composite monarchies did indeed have the power to win advantages for local economies 
in the face of new tax and trade policies imposed by the centralizing state, but they 
could not by themselves deliver stable long-run growth. Nevertheless, the Spanish 
monarchy was in fact successful in raising state taxes, if less consistently and 
effectively than at the political centre, and it was prepared to adapt where new measures 
adversely affected trade between its dominions, which was increasingly based on 
regional specialization after 1650. 
 
2. Demography and economy of seventeenth-century Aragon 
Aside from the fiscal demands of the Spanish State, tax and trade policy and 
debate in Aragon were driven by demographic and economic changes in the 
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seventeenth century. In contrast to the population growth it had enjoyed in the second 
half of the sixteenth century, the region faced serious decline in the seventeenth. King 
Philip III precipitated this process when he ordered the expulsion of the Moriscos 
(formerly Muslim inhabitants of Moorish origin, who had been forcibly converted to 
Christianity in 1526). Around 14,000 families or 18.85 per cent of Aragon’s population 
were driven out in 1610. Even so, a general survey of Aragon performed between 1646 
and 1650 found some 70,729 hearths or around 318,280 inhabitants compared to 51,540 
hearths or approximately 231,930 inhabitants counted in a similar survey carried out in 
1495.  However, the bubonic plague ravaged the whole region in 1648-54, and the 
Cortes estimated that only about 60,000 hearths remained in 1677. Population growth 
only recommenced in the last two decades of the seventeenth century, and Aragon 
again had 76,613 hearths or approximately 344,785 inhabitants by 1711.10 
The expulsion of the Moriscos caused serious economic problems, beginning with 
an abrupt fall in output, investment and demand. Trade networks were affected and 
townships were obliged to assume the debts of their Morisco communities. 
Furthermore, the Moriscos were mainly the vassals of lay lords, and their exodus 
drastically reduced feudal rents, aggravating the financial distress of the high nobility, 
which in turn depressed consumption of luxury goods and hurt the credit system, 
choking off investment.11 The erosion of credit can be discerned in the reaction of the 
municipalities’ creditors (mainly citizens and petty nobles), who increasingly sold or 
donated claims to the church, including loans made to the traditionally more solvent 
royal boroughs, thereby transferring the risk of default or steep falls in interest rates. 
These fears were confirmed by a wave of municipal bankruptcies beginning in the 
villages and finally spreading to the larger towns after 1650, which caused cuts in 
interest rates from the usual 5 per cent to 3 per cent or less.12 Moreover, the financial 
distress of the nobility and the municipalities squeezed the credit offered by the rentier 
classes, driving up the cost of short-term loans. In an effort to rein in the all-too-
common practice of usury, the Diputación proposed fixing the interest rate at 7.5 per 
cent at the Cortes of 1626.13 
The erosion of credit and investment was initially triggered by the financial 
collapse of the commercial bourgeoisie around 1580. Neither the Genoese merchant 
colony, which controlled trade in Aragon until 1620, nor the French, who had created 
an extensive trade network and effectively took over for the rest of the seventeenth 
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century, were much interested in financing Aragonese manufacturing.14 The French 
specialized in importing manufactures, particularly cloth and lace, which accounted for 
29.77 and 21.91 per cent of regional imports from France in 1675. They also exported 
wheat and oil to Catalonia and, especially, wool to France, where demand was so 
intense that this commodity accounted for 77.95 per cent of all Aragonese exports to its 
neighbour in 1675.15 To obtain these products, French merchants would lease the rights 
to collect seigniorial rents, tithes and first fruits from the lay and ecclesiastical lordships 
of Aragon. However, they did not engage in long-term lending or buy land or livestock.  
The growth of French commercial networks after 1620, which included artisans 
and tradesmen, further increased their control over retail trade in both urban and rural 
areas, and by the end of the seventeenth century some traders were even operating as 
the representatives of other merchants established in the towns of southern France, who 
exported goods to Aragon either directly or via the Kingdom of Navarre.16 Meanwhile, 
the Aragonese bourgeoisie largely turned their backs on commerce as they gradually 
recovered from bankruptcy in the second half of the seventeenth century, preferring 
instead to buy land from indebted nobles, lease property and lend to the Spanish 
monarchy, but their recovery was not strong enough to crowd out the French.17 
The Aragonese textile guilds experienced serious capital shortages and 
technological stagnation in the seventeenth century, and their products became ever less 
competitive, especially after 1650. Meanwhile, the expansion of French trading 
precipitated decline through mass imports of cheaper, better quality goods from France. 
The number of textile workshops fell by 42.10 per cent in Barbastro between 1619 and 
1680, and by 51.10 per cent in Saragossa between 1642 and 1721. The reports prepared 
by the councils of Calcena, Caspe, Daroca, Alcañiz and Albarracín as part of an 
investigation ordered by the Diputación in 1667 show a similar fall in textile output. In 
Calcena the council estimated that only 200 of the 400 families engaged in the woollens 
industry in 1640 were still employed by 1667. This decline prompted some expansion 
of textiles-making in rural areas, but only to produce poor quality stuff for local 
consumption, which could not compete in wider markets.18 
The bankruptcy of the Aragonese bourgeoisie and the decline in local industrial 
and craft output allowed French merchants and manufactured goods to take over in the 
second half of the seventeenth century. At this time, the regional economy became 
increasingly oriented to the production and export of wool, wheat, olive oil and meat as 
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demographic decline depressed domestic demand, while the appetite of France, 
Valencia and Catalonia for Aragonese commodities grew ever stronger. In this context, 
farmers tried increasingly to align their production with the changing patterns of 
foreign and domestic demand, as the competition for markets intensified. Thus, the 
incipient local specialisation already discernible in the sixteenth century gathered pace 
after 1650, consolidating comparative advantages in trade.19 There was no serious effort 
to improve the productivity of the land, however. Burdened with debt and lacking the 
means of production in the countryside, many landowners, merchants and money 
lenders preferred simply to deprive the peasants of their surpluses as an easier way to 
make profits.20 
 
3. Royal taxation in Aragon 
3.1. The traditional pattern: royal taxation in the sixteenth century. 
In urgent need of more regular subsidies to finance military campaigns, the 
Spanish monarchy sought in the seventeenth century to modify the basic pattern of royal 
taxation in Aragon, which had developed out of the stable procedure established for the 
collection of royal subsidies under the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic (1479-1516). In 
the late Middle Ages, the king would apply to the Aragonese Parliament either for funds 
or for levies of fully equipped, paid troops, but after 1518 the monarchy only sought 
cash subsidies to pay the cost of raising and maintaining professional armies. The 
Cortes of 1510 set the subsidy at 200,000 libras payable over three years. Of this total, 
156,000 libras (78 per cent) were paid by the municipalities, and the Diputación 
contracted loans to defray the remaining 44,000 libras (22 per cent). Significantly, the 
“ordinary” subsidy granted in 1510 was renewed by all of the Parliaments convened by 
the Hapsburg monarchy until the end of the sixteenth century, sometimes accompanied 
by “extraordinary” subsidies, which ranged between 19,000 and 100,000 libras. As in 
Catalonia and Valencia, the “ordinary” subsidies voted by the Parliaments of Aragon 
stagnated in the sixteenth century. However, the Cortes agreed to pay 400,000 libras in 
1585, and it voted a further 700,000 libras in 1592 as a result of severe pressure after the 
Spanish monarchy had snuffed out an Aragonese rebellion against royal power in 1591 
(see Table 1). These “extraordinary” subsidies were paid exclusively by the Diputación, 
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which again contracted loans. Exceptionally, the monarchy also raised modest 
“donations” from the Aragonese municipalities to defend the Crown of Aragon against 
the threat of foreign invasion or local rebellion.21 
 Table 1 
 Royal cash subsidies approved by the Aragonese Cortes  
 in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (in libras) 
 
Year 
granted 
Total 
amount 
Collection 
period 
Annual 
amount 
Year 
granted 
Total 
amount 
Collection 
period 
Annual 
amount 
1510 219,000 three years 73,000 1564 250,000 three years 83,333.3 
1518 200,000 three years 66,000 1585 400,000 three years 133,333.3 
1528 200,000  three years 66,666.6 1592 700,000 three years 233,333.3 
1533 200,000 three years 66,666.6 1626 2,160,000 fifteen 
years 
144,000 
1537 200,000 three years 66,666.6 1646 576,000 four years 144,000 
1542 300,000 three years 100,000 1678 451,296 eight years 56,412 
1547 222,000 three years 74,000 1686 402,000 twelve 
years 
33,500 
1552 222,000 three years 74,000     
        
 
 
Sources: Blanco, La actuación, 67-68; Savall and Penen, Fueros, I, 474-476, 526-527; II, 370, 402.  
Note: The libra was a monetary unit of account equal to twenty sueldos. After the change to Castilian 
standards of weight and fineness in all silver issues from 1519 onwards, one sueldo equalled half a real, the 
basic silver coin minted in Aragon in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
 
Despite the contribution from the Diputación, royal subsidies in the sixteenth 
century depended largely on municipal levies, which were calculated based on the 
number of hearths (qua fiscal units) according to the census of 1495, applying a 
different tax rate per unit for towns, villages with more than one hundred hearths and 
villages with less. The terms of every royal subsidy approved by the Cortes in the 
sixteenth century allowed town and village councils to apply for three-year sisas reales 
or special taxes on basic foodstuffs, especially grain and meat, on behalf of the royal 
exchequer. However, the Parliament always permitted councils to choose the specific 
taxes they would raise to pay the royal subsidy. The towns and cities normally applied 
sisas, but rural settlements, where the communal tradition had deep roots, mostly 
preferred direct taxation in the form of poll taxes. Every social group had to pay these 
royal taxes, including the clergy and nobility.22 
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Figure 1 
Customs revenues of the Aragonese Diputación (1501-1701) 
(in libras) 
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Sources: Colás and Salas, Aragón, 43; Gómez Zorraquino, La burguesía mercantil, 228-
229 and ADS, Manuscripts 445, fos.85v-87v; 449, fos.107r-108r; 460, fos.1r-8r; 469, fos.62r-
63r; 477, fos.111v-113r; 483, fos.107r-109r; 511, fos.1r-6r; 512, fos.1r-4r; 535, fos.2r -6r; 
fos.3r-6v; 552, fos.1r-6r; 563, fos.1r-8r; 599, fos.1r -6r; 600, fos.3v-7r; 609, fos.1r-6r ; 625, 
fos.1r-6r and LSRAH, Collection Nassarre, 11/7,946 
Note: Extant records of the Diputación’s revenues for the periods 1628-42 and 1678-86 
include the 5 per cent tax on the value of textiles produced. 
 
  
These arrangements for the collection of royal subsidies were conceived for a 
realm where the Cortes met regularly and could vote badly needed funds for the 
sempiternally empty royal purse, given the exchequer’s scant revenues in Aragon. As 
an illustration of these financial difficulties, the Spanish monarchy agreed in the 
sixteenth century to apply 44.44 per cent of the royal taxes paid by towns and villages 
to settle debts and salary arrears incurred by the royal bureaucracy in Aragon. The 
Emperor Charles V respected this system, convening regular Cortes throughout his 
reign (1516-58), but his son Philip II, an altogether more centralising monarch, began 
to change the pattern of royal taxation, convening fewer Parliaments in his reign (1558-
98) while seizing the opportunity presented by Aragon’s economic expansion in the 
 11 
second half of sixteenth century (see Figure 1) to make repeated demands for large 
“extraordinary” subsidies to compensate for the declining frequency of the Parliaments 
at which royal subsidies were ordinarily voted (see Table 1).23 
In contrast to Castile, the continuation of “ordinary” subsidies and the longer 
periods between Cortes actually lowered the burden of royal taxes in Aragon, Catalonia 
and Valencia. This allowed the Aragonese municipalities to increase their borrowing, 
and hence their spending, especially in the second half of the sixteenth century. As well 
as maintaining the local administration and splurging on ever more lavish fiestas and 
civic ceremonies, councils were able to improve the public food supply, undertake 
public works and expand irrigation systems. Low state taxes also allowed the 
Diputación to hold down the customs duties charged at the region’s borders and in the 
larger towns, which were the main source of its revenues. These moderate tariffs 
(generally 5 per cent of the value of goods) favoured trade in sixteenth century Aragon, 
especially after 1550, and this growth was reflected in higher customs revenues (see 
Figure 1). Having assured the upkeep of its bureaucracy, the Diputación used a part of 
its revenues to help found the university of Saragossa in 1582-84 and, especially, to pay 
for the repression of banditry and to build or repair bridges and roads along the vital 
trade routes linking northern Aragon with France between 1560 and 1626.24  
3.2. Royal taxation in the seventeenth century. 
Fiscal policy underwent a crisis in the seventeenth century, as the Spanish 
monarchy spaced out meetings of the Castilian and Aragonese Parliaments even further 
while actively seeking revenue sources that did not need to be voted, such as new 
monopolies and depreciation of the coinage. From the middle of the sixteenth century, 
only the main cities were represented in the Castilian Cortes, and the monarchy 
increasingly resorted to direct negotiation of royal taxes with their representatives in the 
seventeenth century until the last Parliament was convened in 1665. However, the 
Parliaments of Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon were formed by representatives of the 
municipalities, the nobility and the clergy, which made negotiation much more 
complex. As a result of the bellicose policy pursued by the Count-Duke of Olivares, the 
favourite or valido of Philip IV, the monarchy sought greater fiscal cooperation from 
the Crown of Aragon to help finance its involvement in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-
48) through the planned Unión de Armas or Military Union. The monarchy’s initial 
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strategy was to seek a larger annual subsidy over a longer term than had been the case 
in the sixteenth century. However, the contribution demanded by Philip IV in 1626 met 
with determined opposition from the delegates of the Aragonese municipalities and the 
nobility of Valencia, and it was flatly rejected by all the estamentos in Catalonia. This 
opposition marked the beginning of a period of political discord between the 
principality and the Hapsburg monarchy, which ended in revolt and temporary 
secession in 1640-52.25  
The monarchy suddenly began to demand larger and more regular subsidies from 
Aragon between 1626 and 1652 as part of its last ditch effort to defend political and 
military hegemony in Europe during the reign of King Philip IV (1621-65). However, 
the revenues of the royal exchequer in Aragon were barely enough to keep the state 
bureaucracy working in the region, and any further increase was impossible. Therefore, 
these funds had to be raised through the grant of an enormous war chest by the Cortes 
of 1626.26 This royal request immediately split the four estamentos represented in the 
Aragonese Parliament. Opposed by the citizens, it was immediately supported by the 
clergy, and the high and low nobility, who were keen to curry favour with the monarch 
to win access to government offices and ensure their participation in the emerging 
Spanish state. These elites were far more successful than their peers in the Valencian 
Parliament in their efforts to reserve permanent posts in the royal councils and in the 
administration of the American colonies for Aragonese naturals at the Cortes of 1626 
and again in 1645-46. The stiff resistance put up by the citizens in the Parliament of 
1626 was eventually broken by pressure and bribes, although the initial subsidy was 
eventually reduced by some 40 per cent. Nevertheless, it was still twice the sum granted 
by the Valencian Parliament of 1626 for an identical period of fifteen years. Indeed, the 
total of 2,160,000 libras approved in 1626, payable in annual instalments of 144,000 
libras between 1628 and 1642, almost equalled the sum of all “ordinary” and 
“extraordinary” subsidies voted by the Aragonese Cortes between 1518 and 1585 (see 
Table 1). The obsolete census of 1495 was used to decide how the royal taxes would be 
shared among the municipalities until a new census could be prepared on the 
instructions of the Cortes in 1646-50.27   
New taxes would be levied on Aragon as a result of the outbreak of hostilities 
between Spain and France in 1635 and the 1640 uprising against Philip IV in Catalonia, 
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which prompted the invasion of western Aragon by a Franco-Catalan army in 1641-43. 
Loyalty to the monarch and the defence of the realm facilitated the acquiescence of the 
regional elites, who agreed at the extraordinary assemblies of the estamentos held in 
1641-45 to raise local militias and to share the cost of maintaining these troops among 
the towns without parliamentary approval.28 In addition, town and village councils had 
to foot the bill for the royal army billeted in Aragon. The costs incurred between 1626 
and 1646 amounted to more than 2,000,000 libras according to the estimates of the 
citizens at the Cortes of 1645-46. With the inducement of fresh royal favours and 
offices for the regional elites, this Parliament extended the annual subsidy of 144,000 
libras granted in 1626 for a further four years (1647-50) in order to support the regional 
militias recruited for the war in Catalonia. In contrast, the Cortes of Valencia had 
granted just 57,600 libras per annum over a period of six years in 1645, although the 
kingdom’s taxpaying population was only 13.30 per cent smaller than Aragon’s in 
1646-50.29 In return for extending the subsidy, the Aragonese Cortes agreed to exempt 
the municipalities from any liability for billeting the royal army throughout the period 
of the subsidy, as it would do again in 1677-78.30 
The traditional method of collecting revenues via municipal taxes, which had 
existed since the thirteenth century and became fixed in 1495, proved unequal to the 
increase in royal taxation because of the financial distress of Aragon’s town and village 
councils in the seventeenth century. Already unable to raise sufficient revenues to 
tackle the growth in their expenditure in the second half of the sixteenth century, the 
councils’ situation only worsened in the seventeenth until even the perpetual recourse 
to contract credit became insufficient, forcing the municipalities to seek ever more 
frequent deferrals and cuts in interest charges from the end of the sixteenth century. As 
councils slid inexorably towards bankruptcy, these arrangements gradually handed the 
management of municipal treasuries over to administrators appointed by boards of 
creditors dominated by the clergy in return for assurances that the local political and 
legal administration would be maintained, as well as municipal and communal assets.31   
Given the parlous state of municipal finances, the Cortes of 1626 opted to transfer 
a larger share of the burden of royal taxes to the Diputación despite the fall in customs 
revenues caused by the decline in Aragon’s trade (see Figure 1), making it necessary to 
approve new duties and taxes on domestic textile production for the 15-year term of the 
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subsidy. In the end, the municipalities paid only 59.15 per cent of the annual charge 
between 1628 and 1638. However, in 1639-42 the municipal share soared to 84.19 per 
cent, as the Diputación’s financial surpluses were eaten away by interest payments on 
outstanding loans and the loss of revenues caused by the temporary closure of the 
French border on the orders of the Spanish monarchy in 1635. Under intense royal 
pressure, the Diputación continued to hand over its surpluses to the state treasury in the 
form of “donations” or advances on unpaid municipal contributions during the critical 
years of the war in Catalonia. Meanwhile, the Cortes of 1645-46 again boosted the 
institution’s revenues to contain its debt, allowing the tax on textiles production to lapse 
but raising customs duties in 1647-50. After providing for the defence of Catalonia in 
1654-56, the Diputación continued to grant smaller donations for the rest of the 
seventeenth century.32 
Having obtained military cooperation from the Cortes of Aragon and Valencia 
held in 1645-46, while the Catalan conflict was at its height, the monarchy did not 
again convene the Parliaments of either Valencia or Catalonia for the rest of the 
seventeenth century, mainly because of the difficulty of wringing regular subsidies out 
of the estamentos and concern to avoid complaints about increasing royal interference 
in elections to public office in the Crown of Aragon.33 Instead, royal delegates raised 
loans and military levies directly from the regional elites and institutions in exchange 
for modest economic reforms and privileges, honours and government office. Councils 
formed by representatives of the estates or the nobility were created to negotiate with 
the royal delegates at this time, although they were never vested with legislative 
powers. Only Aragon succeeded in convening its Cortes in 1677-78 thanks to the 
influence at court of the bastard son of Philip IV, Don Juan José de Austria, who was 
keen to requite the strong political support he received in the region while he was 
viceroy (1669-75).34  
The Cortes of 1678 were keenly aware that even the main towns and cities of 
Aragon were teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, and accordingly they voted a twenty-
year subsidy to maintain regional troops for an annual sum of 56,412 libras, just 39.18 
per cent of the amount approved in 1646, even though the taxpaying population had 
shrunk by only 15.15 per cent between 1646 and 1677 (see Table 1). As the necessary 
funds could not be efficiently raised through municipal taxes, the Parliament doubled 
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customs duties and the tax on textiles production was restored. By voting smaller 
subsidies, however, the Aragonese elites saw their hopes of greater participation in the 
state and colonial administration dashed. Having allied itself with Holland and the 
Austrian Empire to fight France in 1673-78, the Spanish monarchy was under less 
pressure from its foreign wars than it had been during the Cortes of 1626 and 1645-46. 
The monarchy therefore confirmed the fueros approved by previous Parliaments at the 
Cortes of 1678, permanently reserving certain posts for the Aragonese elites in the 
administration, but it hardly granted any new offices.35 The influence of Don Juan José 
de Austria as prime minister of Spain in 1677-79 ensured titles and appointments to 
important offices at court for some Aragonese nobles, but no positions were 
permanently reserved for Aragonese naturals.36 
The fiscal reforms approved in 1678 hurt legal trade and industry and, as provided 
by the Cortes of 1677-78, delegates from all four estamentos gathered in a special 
assembly vested with legislative powers in 1684-86 to negotiate with royal delegates. 
Acting in lieu of a new Parliament, the assembly cut the annual subsidy granted in 1678 
by 40.6 per cent, setting it at just 33,500 libras (see Table 1), given the difficulty of 
collecting the sums required and as a necessary step to reverse the hike in customs 
duties. New monopolies on salt and tobacco were temporarily established to help pay 
the subsidy.37 These two monopolies, which had existed in the Crown of Castile since 
1564 and 1636 respectively, were created partly because the resulting revenues were 
easier and cheaper to collect than customs duties, and partly because the Hapsburg 
monarchy was keen to extend its control over the markets for tobacco and salt 
throughout north-eastern Spain. Not without resistance, the Bourbon monarchy 
succeeded in imposing these lucrative monopolies permanently throughout the Spanish 
regions of the former Crown of Aragon in the eighteenth century.  
The arrangements with creditors made by town and village councils were 
discussed at the Cortes of 1626 and from the mid-seventeenth century onwards they 
required royal consent. This was provided by the privy Council of Aragon, which 
assisted the monarch in Madrid with political, legal and fiscal issues affecting the 
Spanish dominions of the Crown of Aragon. Hence, the Spanish monarchy was 
perfectly well informed about the financial straits of the region’s municipalities.38 
Nevertheless, Kings Philip IV and Charles II demanded constant “donations”, as they 
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also did in Catalonia and Valencia. Loans worth more than 2,050,000 libras and 
significant levies of local militias were extracted from the Aragonese capital, 
Saragossa, between 1629 and 1686, when the city finally sank into bankruptcy. Only 
moderate donations and levies were obtained from the other towns of Aragon between 
the end of the war in Catalonia in 1652 and the renewed invasion by the French in 
1694-97, except during the government of the viceroy Don Juan José de Austria, who 
succeeded in raising the contributions levied from both institutions and private 
taxpayers.39 
As in the cases of Catalonia and Valencia, it is not possible to trace exactly the 
development of royal taxation in seventeenth century Aragon for want of accurate 
information on the total loans and donations made by the Diputación and the 
municipalities, and on the cost of recruiting and billeting troops in the region. However, 
the repeated use of such fiscal measures and the longer subsidies granted by the Cortes 
would unquestionably have increased the burden compared to the preceding century. 
This taxation was particularly intense in 1628-52, forcing the municipalities to raise 
their own taxes, which were levied preferentially on domestic consumption of basic 
foodstuffs like grain and meat in the larger towns. This indirect municipal taxation 
eroded the working capital, savings and self-financing capacity of the productive 
classes, while depressing disposable incomes among the population at large.40 
However, customs duties were also raised to help pay subsidies from 1626 onwards, 
and the rising tide of municipal debt imposed some moderation on royal taxation after 
1652. Finally, these fiscal policies affected prices and therefore the region’s economy, 
which underwent profound restructuring throughout the seventeenth century. 
 
4. Fiscal and economic debate in seventeenth century Aragon 
4.1. The Diputación and support for traditional free trade policies  
The ongoing restructuring of the economy intensified the tussle for control of 
trade policy between the Spanish State and the Aragonese institutions. Spain fought 
five full-scale wars against France in the seventeenth century (1635-59, 1667-68, 1673-
78, 1683-84, 1689-97), and each time the Spanish monarchy ordered the end of all trade 
between Aragon and its neighbour in order to stop the French from selling their 
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manufactures across the Pyrenees while taking home Spanish silver and Aragonese 
commodities. Trade was even banned in 1662, when France and Spain were nominally 
at peace. The Spanish monarchy also ordered the seizure of property belonging to 
French immigrants, including naturalised residents.  
These measures were opposed tooth and nail by the Diputación, which argued 
that the interruption of trade with France would be detrimental both to the Aragonese 
economy and to its own fiscal interest, which depended largely on the customs duties 
raised along the Pyrenean border. This institution was responsible for upholding the 
kingdom’s customary laws, which included the freedom to trade (sanctioned by the 
Aragonese Parliament since the late medieval period) and placed naturalised 
immigrants under royal protection. Accordingly, the Diputación held that the royal 
orders banning trade and seizing French property were unlawful and it appealed on 
several occasions to the Corte del Justicia de Aragón. Chaired by the Justicia, the 
principal magistrate empowered to judge legal conflicts between the monarchy and its 
subjects in Aragon, this court was charged with guaranteeing the fueros, which 
consisted of local rights and charters granted by the king to the municipalities since the 
eleventh century. The fueros had been compiled with acts of the Aragonese Parliament 
since 1247, and this corpus formed the dominant legal system in the region until its 
abolition in 1707. The court found in favour of the Diputación in 1674.  
Following this victory, the Diputación put up determined legal resistance to 
similar royal measures in 1683-84 and 1689-97. In 1689 it refused to seize the goods of 
French merchants until the monarchy agreed in 1693 to sidestep legal obstacles by 
substituting sequestration for ‘donations’. The Diputación’s attitude thus allayed 
punitive measures and favoured the continuity of French trade.41 
Significantly, legal resistance to royal measures was far more determined in 
Aragon than in Catalonia or Valencia, especially in 1683-84 and 1689-97. The 
Diputación of Valencia had always had more limited political powers and funding, 
while the Spanish monarchy had increased its political control over the Catalan 
Diputación, which was in any case hobbled by bankruptcy in the second half of the 
seventeenth century.42 After a last protest to the viceroy in 1675, the Catalan 
Diputación fell silent in its opposition to royal orders prohibiting trade with France. 
Furthermore, the military occupation of Catalonia in 1641-52 and in 1694-97, and the 
annexation of the Roussillon district by France in 1659 persuaded the local elites to 
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cooperate with the monarchy in the last three decades of the seventeenth century. 
Having begun slowly to recover after 1680, the commercial bourgeoisie and textile 
guilds of Barcelona supported trade bans and reprisals against the French, whom they 
saw as competitors in the regional market.43 
However, the Aragonese Diputación also had to defend domestic free trade 
against other regional institutions. It took legal action in the Corte del Justicia several 
times in the seventeenth century to contest measures adopted by the craft guilds and 
municipalities to protect local artisans and merchants from French competition by 
creating barriers such as quality controls, new taxes and official prices for foreign 
goods. The municipal officials of Saragossa were especially proactive in this regard, 
even banning the entry of foreign woollens, silks, and gold and silver brocade into the 
capital in 1675, a regulation which was immediately struck down by the Diputación. 
These legal actions protected the landed interests of the church and the nobility. These 
agrarian elites appreciated the benefits of trade with France, which offered them the 
opportunity both to sell their own output and to consume competitive French goods.44 
As we shall see below, however, the interests of the towns and the agrarian elites 
clashed at every Parliament held in the seventeenth century, and the search for new 
revenue sources for the royal treasury conditioned all proposals for trade reform. 
 
4.2. Royal taxation and protectionism (1626-50). 
Despite the Diputación’s legal victories, the increasing tax demands made by the 
monarchy at the Cortes of 1626 resulted in a further hike in Aragonese customs duties. 
Import and export duties were doubled from 5 to 10 per cent of value between 1628 and 
1642 to pay royal subsidies. In the interest of landlords and the recipients of rents, who 
were numerous among the clergy, nobility and even wealthier citizens, export duties on 
the main commodities and foodstuffs (wool, wheat and meat) were set at a lower rate of 
around 5 per cent, however. This rate was also applied to import and export duties on 
other essential foodstuffs like wine and fresh fish in order to hold down retail prices, 
although rising olive oil exports were taxed at 10 per cent to counteract widespread 
black-marketeering at the border. Against the opinion of the Diputación, the Cortes also 
banned the export of gold and silver coins to other Spanish territories or abroad.45  
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Raising tariffs was a risky strategy given the sharp contraction in regional trade. 
After peaking in 1606-11, the customs revenues obtained by the Diputación fell sharply 
in 1612, because the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1610 had hurt the credit market and 
depressed domestic investment, output and demand (see Figure 1). Aware of the 
shortage of capital affecting the textile guilds, itself a result of these processes, the 
Cortes of 1626 prohibited the import of gold and silver brocade, silk and woollens from 
abroad, not including tapestry work or linens. The Parliament thus changed its 
traditional free trade policy despite the objections of the Diputación, which protested 
that most imported woollens and silks came from sovereign Spanish territories like 
Catalonia, Valencia and Flanders.46 However, the transit of goods bound from one 
Spanish territory to another through Aragon was permitted in order cushion the impact 
of the ban on imports from Castile, Navarre, Valencia and Catalonia, and on the 
Diputación’s own revenues (see map). An additional tax of 5 per cent of value was 
imposed for the fifteen-year term of the royal subsidy on locally produced woollens, 
silks, and gold or silver brocade, which were now protected by the import ban. Also, the 
municipalities’ authority to set the retail prices of textiles in local markets was 
confirmed.47  
The protectionist policies demanded by the textile guilds of Catalonia in 1620 and 
1630 came to nothing, because no Parliament was held in the principality, but similar 
proposals triumphed in Aragon because they offered the means of paying higher state 
taxation. The Parliament of Valencia also raised customs duties on imports by 5 per cent 
in 1626, although it was able to exempt grain and meat imported from Aragon, having 
granted a smaller subsidy. After new municipal taxes had been limited to the production 
of wine, it only became necessary to tax foodstuffs and textiles in Valencia to pay for 
troops to fight in Catalonia and to meet the subsidy of 1645. Imports of foreign cloth 
continued to be permitted to secure the kingdom’s customs revenues.48 
Black-marketeering flourished in Aragon between 1628 and 1642, driven by the 
new taxes on trade and textiles production, which pushed up costs and undermined the 
competitiveness of local manufactures. Neither of these protectionist measures 
prevented imports of French manufactures in the second quarter of the century, whether 
by smuggling, under import licences granted by royal institutions, or by the fraudulent 
claim that goods were destined for sale in other Spanish dominions. The Diputación 
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itself facilitated this process by seeking authorisation from the Corte del Justicia de 
Aragón (in 1630, 1633 and 1638) to seize, mark and sell illegal goods rather than 
burning them as the protectionist party demanded. The combination of black-
marketeering and royal efforts to prevent Aragonese trade with France substantially 
lowered the revenues of the Diputación between 1635 and 1640 (see Figure 1).49 
The merchant class, formed by wealthy citizens and petty nobles, insisted at the 
Cortes of 1645-46 on banning the import of foreign fabrics and the export of native 
currency, and on strict supervision of commercial transactions in Aragon. Several 
Saragossa guilds also advocated such measures to prevent the expansion of French 
commerce. Despite support for these proposals among the citizens, pressure from the 
high nobility and the clergy led the Parliament to repeal the ban on textiles imports, 
accepting the failure of its protectionist policy.50 However, export and import duties 
were raised to 13 per cent of value between 1647 and 1650 to pay for regional militias 
recruited to fight in Catalonia. This hike in customs duties sought to profit from the 
growth in trade generated by the presence of the Court and the royal army in Aragon 
during the conflict. The moderate import/export duty of around 5 per cent of value on 
wool and certain essential foodstuffs set in 1626 was maintained, as was the ban on 
exports of gold and silver approved with one eye on France as the main destination for 
outflows of Aragonese and Castilian coins.51 
Despite increasing its revenues during the war in Catalonia, the Diputación was 
obliged to collect the new duties and the output tax on textiles itself, because rampant 
fraud and tax evasion put off the usual tax farmers. The increase in customs duties 
applied in 1647-50 compounded these problems by increasing transaction costs in the 
regional market. As a consequence, the revenues obtained by the Diputación fell by 
around 33 per cent over the third quarter of the seventeenth century, even though duties 
were again lowered to 10 per cent in 1651. This was partly due to the contraction in 
trade after the Court and royal army left Aragon, and partly to persistent black-
marketeering and tax evasion (see Figure 1).52  
 
4.3. Royal taxation and the trade debate (1674-1700) 
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Against this background of commercial decline and legal confrontation, the trade 
policy debate only took shape in Aragon when the viceroy Don Juan José de Austria 
created the Junta de Comercio (Board of Trade) in Saragossa in 1674. This body was 
formed by delegates of the main representative institutions including the Corte del 
Justicia de Aragón and the Diputación, royal advisers and senior municipal officers of 
the city of Saragossa, and its mission was to seek solutions to the region’s economic 
problems, chiefly French control of commercial transactions, industrial decline, the 
shortage of coinage and depopulation.53 The numerous written depositions submitted to 
the Junta de Comercio by the Aragonese arbitristas (political economists) reflect two 
opposing lines of economic thinking on trade policy. One of these, backed by the 
Diputación, favoured removing all impediments to trade and suppressing some tariffs, 
such as royal and private tolls. The Diputación had urged this reform on the Spanish 
monarchy since the early seventeenth-century, especially at the Parliament of 1626, 
although it supported the continuation of customs posts on Aragon’s borders and in the 
large towns because they provided its main source of revenues.54  However, the 
Aragonese towns and, in particular, the city of Saragossa supported the import ban and 
tighter municipal control over local transactions under pressure from urban artisans and 
merchants, whose main concern was foreign competition. Contributing to this debate, 
the free-trade advocate José Marcelo de Sotomayor Uribe penned his Discurso foral, 
jurídico y político en defensa del libre comercio in opposition to the municipal statute 
passed in Saragossa in 1675 banning the sale of imported textiles in the city. However, 
the numerous champions of protectionism gained greater influence in the Junta de 
Comercio and in the Cortes of 1677-78, where a flurry of proposals from citizens, 
minor nobility and artisans were also presented. Led by some among the infanzones, 
low-ranking gentry who engaged in trade and manufacturing, the guilds even sought in 
1677 to influence the decisions of the Parliament by organizing protests in the streets of 
Saragossa and packing meetings of the petty nobility with their supporters.55 
This debate was conditioned by French dominance in trade and manufacturing, 
which became firmly established in Aragon after an earlier ban on textiles imports was 
repealed in 1646. The French were accused of causing poverty and depopulating the 
region by pushing aside Aragonese traders, carrying off the silver coinage, ruining local 
artisans by importing their own manufactures, and exporting the wool and silk needed 
by weavers, which they could obtain cheaply because they controlled trade. In response, 
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artisans, merchants and arbitristas all petitioned the Junta de Comercio and the Cortes 
of 1677-78 to ban imports of French goods. To ensure compliance, they urged that the 
municipalities should be allowed to supervise local markets, set prices and prevent the 
sale of any goods that were not in conformity with Aragonese standards. They also 
sought changes in the law to require wool and silk producers and merchants to sell their 
goods preferentially to local municipalities and natives rather than to foreigners, at the 
same time pressing for the enforcement of export bans and further hikes in export 
duties. Antonio Cubero Sebastián, for example, recommended to the Junta de Comercio 
in 1674 that exports of wool should be taxed at 10 per cent of value. Nevertheless, some 
protectionist thinkers advised lowering tolls and duties on the export of manufactured 
goods in order to regenerate textile production and trade. José Gracián Serrano even 
defended the abolition of all tolls and customs duties in Aragon at the Cortes of 1678.56 
The main problem for the protectionist party was the creation of new taxes to 
compensate the Diputación for the loss of revenues implicit in the proposed ban on 
textiles imports and reduction in customs duties.  The guilds proposed a municipal poll 
tax that would include the nobility and clergy. However, other social groups considered 
that the tax should be paid by textiles workers only, as they were the main beneficiaries 
of the ban.57 The fiscal problem was even worse at the Cortes of 1677-78, because new 
revenue sources were needed to pay the royal subsidy given the dire financial straits of 
the municipalities. Despite losing revenues and local control over markets, the citizens 
agreed to raise the tax on exports of wine and oil to 2 per cent of value and to establish 
regional monopolies over luxuries like tobacco, paper, playing cards, sugar, cocoa, 
pepper and spices. Though this initial proposal was approved, the high and low nobility 
suggested replacing the proposed new monopolies with higher customs duties or taxes 
on textiles production, in line with the policy adopted by the Cortes in 1626 and 1646. 
For its part, the church advocated reducing the Diputación’s debt only by cancelling 
loans or lowering interest rates.  Finally, opposition from the agrarian elites to any 
increase in export duties on commodities and the difficulty of establishing monopolies 
in Aragon meant that the proposals of the nobility carried considerable weight with the 
Parliament.58 
Designed as a reaction against French control of trade, the protectionist policy 
adopted in 1678 sought to appease both the Spanish monarchy and the main social 
groups able to influence the Cortes. Imports of woollens, silks, and gold or silver 
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brocade, peddlers’ wares and trinkets manufactured abroad were banned in the interests 
of urban merchants and artisans. At the urging of the protectionists, this ban was 
extended to all Spanish territories including Castile in a bid to prop up local textile 
production and prevent French wares from entering Aragon via alternative routes, and it 
also included foreign goods in transit to other destinations. In order to compensate the 
Diputación for the resulting loss of customs revenues, out of which royal subsidies were 
paid, both import and export duties were set at 20 per cent of product value. However, 
export duties on the main Aragonese commodities (wool, cereals, wine, meat and olive 
oil) were left unchanged to stimulate production, satisfying both landlords and tenants. 
As additional compensation for the Diputación, another 5 per cent of value was 
imposed on locally produced woollens, silks, gold and silver brocade, and tanned hides. 
However, duties on fabrics were lifted to promote exports. The interests of Aragonese 
livestock farmers prevented any restrictions on the wool trade, although the Parliament 
did ban exports of raw silk in order to foster craft production in Aragon.59  
Similarly, the financial needs of the monarchy prevented any moves to mitigate 
the foreseeable rise in transaction costs caused by the new taxes and duties in the 
regional market. Although the Cortes voted to abolish royal tolls, which added 5 per 
cent to transit costs, the enormous compensation demanded by the royal treasury 
(14,500 libras per annum) frustrated application of this measure. Undeterred, the Cortes 
immediately ordered a commission of senior municipal officials to assess the value of 
foreign and domestic goods in each local market and prevent excessive price rises, 
especially for textiles. The Parliament also prohibited the inclusion of any hidden taxes 
in assessed prices in order to facilitate regional trade.60 
To the chagrin of the protectionist party, the prohibition of textiles imports was 
soon circumvented by fraud and smuggling.61 Already burdened by output taxes, native 
textiles actually lost share in the regional market to French products even though the 
ban drove up retail prices. Some Aragonese merchants firmly opposed the protectionist 
policy, observing in 1684 that the ban had raised the price of French textiles in the 
regional market by 20 per cent since 1678.62 Many impoverished textile workers moved 
to Valencia to carry on their trade while others drifted away in search of work.63 Exports 
of commodities to Catalonia, Valencia and France remained strong, however, as prices 
continued to fall and institutional barriers to exports of wheat and oil were gradually 
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removed in the second half of the seventeenth century, making Aragonese produce 
increasingly competitive.64  
The increase in customs duties and their application to goods in transit to other 
territories caused serious upset in the regional market. Many foreign merchants avoided 
Aragon, choosing other trade routes instead. Furthermore, other Spanish realms affected 
by Aragonese protectionism responded in kind. Regional imports of Aragonese wine 
and fabrics were banned by the Navarrese Parliaments of 1677-78 and 1684-85, and the 
Spanish monarchy imposed legal barriers in Castile in 1682 (see the map).65 These 
trammels not only hindered domestic and foreign trade, but also encouraged black-
market practices. The result was to depress the Diputación’s revenues in 1679-83 below 
the level of 1628-50, despite the sharp hike in tariffs (see Figure 1). 
Foreseeing difficulties ahead, the Cortes of 1677-78 provided for an assembly to 
be formed by two delegates from each of the four estamentos to review the new trade 
policy after six years. When protectionism failed to halt the decline of regional 
manufacturing, the assembly delegates and their advisers met in 1684-86 to negotiate 
with royal delegates, sparking renewed debate among the Aragonese arbitristas. 
Notably, Diego José Dormer addressed his Discursos históricos-políticos to the 
assembly in 1684. Like Sotomayor in 1675, Dormer based his arguments on fueros 
approved by the Cortes in 1247, 1283, 1325, 1348, 1456, 1461 and 1528, which 
protected the free movement of goods and prohibited the creation of new tolls or 
imposts in Aragon, claiming that all of the temporary restrictions on trade voted by the 
Cortes in the past had ended in failure. He contended that Aragon’s economic decline 
was due rather to the weakness of the region’s commercial bourgeoisie and the scarcity 
of skilled and industrious artisans than to the activities of the French. On these grounds, 
he proposed the repeal of all import bans and municipal or guild controls on domestic 
transactions to encourage trade, and the abolition of royal tolls, regional customs posts 
and output taxes on textiles. The monarchy and the Diputación would be compensated 
out of the revenues generated by a regional salt monopoly and a municipal tax similar to 
that applied to meet royal subsidies in 1647-50. Initially based on the census of 1646, 
the local distribution of the tax would be revised every ten years after a new census had 
been taken.66  
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Supported by many of the towns and the craft guilds, the protectionist party 
hardened its opposition to French trade before the assembly of the estamentos held in 
1684-86. In a memorandum submitted in 1684, José Tudela Tarazona advocated closing 
down all trade with France, and José Gracián Serrano Manero responded to Dormer by 
arguing for an extension of the trade ban to the neighbouring Spanish domains. Given 
these territories’ very limited exports of goods to Aragon, this proposal would have had 
little impact on them, but it might have prevented fraudulent imports of French goods. 
Like Dormer, Tudela and Serrano believed that the hike in customs duties and the tax 
on textiles production approved in 1678 hurt the economy, and they too recommended 
abolishing all customs duties and tolls in Aragon. Furthermore, the fiscal compensation 
offered to the Diputación, the monarchy and private parties would not include any tax 
on domestic textiles production. As he had done at the Parliament of 1678, Serrano 
urged the 1684 assembly to share the burden of royal taxes among the municipalities 
using the traditional methods, and to tax essential foodstuffs like bread. Both Serrano 
and Tudela insisted on maintaining the municipal right, approved in 1678, to set retail 
prices in local markets.67 
Shocked by the demands of the more radical protectionists, some regional 
authorities sought to ease the pressure. In 1684 the city of Saragossa punished a number 
of artisans for trying to coerce representatives of the clergy into voting in favour of laws 
discriminating against French residents in Aragon, and in the same year the Justicia de 
Aragón took legal action to prevent the petty nobility from harassing the other estates. 
Despite initial support for protectionism among the gentry and citizens at the assembly 
of 1684-86, traditional free trade policies eventually triumphed thanks to combined 
pressure from the agrarian elites and the monarchy, which was keen to foster Aragonese 
trade with Castile and the other Spanish realms. The monarchy reaffirmed this policy in 
Catalonia in 1699 and 1700 when the viceroy turned down petitions from the Barcelona 
guilds to ban exports of domestic silk and wool, and imports of any fabrics not 
manufactured in the region.68 
The assembly finally removed the ban on textiles imports in 1686, maintaining the 
prohibition on pedlars’ wares and trinkets. Customs duties were again set at 10 per cent 
of the value of goods in general and remained unchanged for exports of the main 
Aragonese commodities. Unrestricted exports of raw silk were again allowed except in 
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times of scarcity, but a reciprocal ban was imposed on wine imported from the 
neighbouring Kingdom of Navarre. The assembly also removed the output tax imposed 
in 1678 to foster the recovery of textiles manufacturing, instead imposing a 5 per cent 
tariff on exports. Legal impediments to the sale of fabrics manufactured in Aragon in 
local markets were also abolished. Accordingly, the artisans’ right to examine foreign 
and domestic goods sold in their town and village markets was subjected to stricter 
municipal control in order to prevent the rejection of merchandise on spurious quality 
grounds. However, the municipal commissions created in 1678 continued to assess the 
prices of both domestic and foreign fabrics sold in Aragon.69 
This trade reform reduced the Diputación’s revenues by lowering customs duties, 
which forced the Spanish monarchy to accept a 40.6 per cent cut in the annual royal 
subsidy from 1686 to the end of the payment period. In return, the moderation of duties 
was expected to facilitate trade not only in Aragon but in the whole of north-eastern 
Spain. The removal of the tolls approved by the Cortes of 1678 required similar fiscal 
cooperation. All of the tolls (royal, seigniorial, municipal and others) created in Aragon 
since the Middle Ages were finally abolished and the number of customs posts on the 
borders was reduced. As a result, 22.15 per cent of the new royal subsidy was applied to 
pay annual compensation for the suppression of tolls, consisting of 6,000 libras for the 
royal exchequer (41.4 per cent of the amount requested by the monarchy in 1678) and 
around 1,420 libras for other persons and institutions affected.70   
Favoured by the expansion of demand driven by the recovery in Aragon’s 
population in the last two decades of the seventeenth century, this reform slowly helped 
revitalise regional trade and the Diputación’s revenues in 1696-1701 finally returned to 
something like the levels of 1668-77 (see Figure 1). Goods again began to move 
through the region in transit to other territories, and business returned to legal markets. 
The effects on regional output were uneven, however. Despite the repeal of the output 
tax on textiles manufacturing, the industry remained uncompetitive and its decline 
intensified. Though textiles output actually grew at a moderate pace in the large towns 
immediately after 1730 on the back of rising domestic consumption, it never recovered 
its pre-1650 level. However, unrestricted imports of fabrics provided French merchants 
with the wherewithal to buy ever more Aragonese commodities, driving growth in both 
output and exports, although this gradual expansion was not down to the conquest of 
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new markets. In view of scant Aragonese demand for their own manufactures and raw 
materials, both Castile and above all Navarre maintained legal and administrative 
barriers to imports and the transit of Aragonese goods until the end of the seventeenth 
century. Nevertheless, the region’s products could still be sold in Catalonia, Valencia 
and France, which remained much more important markets than Castile.71  
In short, the reform intensified the outcomes of product specialisation and trade 
complementarity resulting from the gradual restructuring of the regional economy both 
in Aragon and in north-eastern Spain as a whole, in a process which lasted throughout 
the seventeenth century, though it gathered pace after 1650. The repeal of tariff barriers 
between the Crowns of Castile and Aragon decreed by the more centralizing Bourbon 
state in 1714-17 accelerated the process by facilitating the movement of goods. 
Dominated by French merchants until 1740, and then by the Navarrese until 1770, the 
Aragonese market was flooded with foreign fabrics, mainly from France. Catalan 
manufactures only took over after 1770, once the principality’s merchants had won 
control of the main trade flows. 72 
 
5. Conclusions  
As recent trends in Political History and Sociology have shown for the whole of 
early modern Europe, the progress of the “fiscal state” under the multiple sovereignty of 
the Hapsburg monarchy in seventeenth century Spain was slow and difficult in regions 
enjoying high levels of autonomy like the Kingdom of Aragon. The monarchy met with 
determined resistance from the regional elites and representative institutions when it 
sought to ban trade between Aragon and France, which was crucial to the regional 
economy. By integrating the Aragonese elites into the state and colonial administration, 
however, the monarchy secured their acquiescence in more systematic and higher state 
taxation in the second quarter of the century, a critical period in Spain’s struggle for 
European hegemony. Having reduced their contribution after the war of secession in 
Catalonia, these elites also agreed to the continuation of royal taxes in the last quarter of 
the century, albeit at a lower level, partly to obtain honours and permanent posts for 
Aragonese naturals in the state administration, although their aspirations were largely 
 28 
disappointed, but mainly because they needed a free hand to formulate trade policy via 
parliamentary legislation in order to remedy the region’s economic problems.  
The state’s fiscal policy encountered some serious economic and institutional 
problems, which affected tax efficiency and aggravated undesirable outcomes with the 
result that it was applied patchily in a region undergoing both demographic and 
economic decline, and taxes combined parliamentary grants of regular subsidies running 
for decades with a raft of donations, loans and military levies raised from both private 
parties and institutions. The increasingly straitened finances of the municipalities and 
the Diputación, the institutions which had paid royal subsidies in the sixteenth century, 
posed a further problem. Furthermore, the distribution of the tax burden was 
complicated by the lack of up-to-date censuses until 1646-50, so that it fell most heavily 
on the capital. Meanwhile, rising municipal taxation of the main foodstuffs eroded the 
working capital, savings and self-financing capacity of the productive classes, while 
depressing disposable incomes among the population as a whole. The fiscal policy 
agreed with the regional elites in the Aragonese Parliament taxed trade and textiles 
output in 1626, 1646 and 1678 to mitigate these effects, but this option worsened the 
decline of regional manufacturing, raised transaction costs and generated serious 
imbalances in both domestic and foreign markets. These grave problems forced the 
monarchy to reduce taxes on trade in 1686 and to introduce new monopolies on salt and 
tobacco, which had a less pernicious impact on regional economic growth. Even so, the 
tariff barriers erected in Aragon after 1626 in response to state taxation lingered on 
throughout the century, and according to Epstein the situation was only corrected in 
1714-17 when the new Bourbon monarchy abolished internal customs between the 
Crowns of Castile and Aragon as part of its drive to create a unified, national market. 
Weakened by their infrequency and the conflicting political and economic 
interests of the estamentos, the Cortes reduced royal subsidies in 1678-97, but they 
proved unequal to the task of designing any more satisfactory fiscal and trade policies 
for the regional economy. The protectionist measures enacted in 1626 and 1645-46 
ensured the collection of royal subsidies by taxing domestic manufactures and imported 
goods, but they failed to reactivate the textiles industry while raising transaction costs, 
and they exacerbated smuggling and unlawful practices until their eventual repeal in 
1651 under pressure from the agrarian elites. The exceptional Parliaments convened in 
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1677-78 and 1684-86 prompted intense debate on fiscal and trade matters in Aragon. 
However, the Cortes flatly rejected the creation of any new monopolies to lower or 
remove customs duties and tolls, as recommended by the Diputación and the arbitristas. 
Instead, taxes were raised on textiles production and imports of other foreign 
manufactures as the quid pro quo for a ban on textiles imports and transit goods. As in 
1626, the authority of the municipalities to set the retail prices of textiles and other 
foreign goods in local markets was reconfirmed. Overall, this policy hobbled trade 
throughout the north-east of Spain without actually preventing the decay of domestic 
manufacturing in Aragon, which forced the agrarian elites to negotiate with the royal 
delegates in 1684-86 in order to seek a reduction in the tax burden, the abolition of all 
tolls created since mediaeval times, and a relaxation of regional and local protectionism. 
These reforms lowered transaction costs, favouring gradual growth in farm output and 
trade throughout the region at the end of the century.  
Finally, the more independent and consistent policy of the Diputación eventually 
succeeded in imposing more favourable economic conditions, generally based on 
customary laws and supported by the region’s rentier elites. It also improved roads 
between 1560 and 1626 in order to foster trade. Furthermore, its significant contribution 
to state taxation between 1628 and 1656 sought not only to satisfy royal demands but 
also to alleviate municipal indebtedness and to protect the territorial integrity of the 
kingdom of Aragon. The Diputación thus guaranteed property rights and the transit of 
goods against interference not only from the monarchy, as North and Weingast explain, 
but also from regional institutions and groups throughout the seventeenth century. 
Finally, its lukewarm collaboration with the import bans on textiles imposed by the 
Cortes contributed to their eventual failure. At the cost of accepting French commercial 
and manufacturing predominance in Aragon, the Diputación’s free trade policy 
encouraged increasing regional specialization in export-oriented agriculture after 1650, 
despite a chronic lack of investment. This restructuring slowly helped the Aragonese 
economy to recover, although growth was not strong enough to prevent its becoming 
ever more dependent on Catalonia in the eighteenth century, and the lag only intensified 
when internal customs were abolished in north-eastern Spain in 1714-17. In contrast, 
the recovery in manufacturing and trade which accompanied agricultural specialization 
in Catalonia towards the end of the seventeenth century was driven by the region’s 
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much more dynamic elites, who proved decisive in laying the foundations for long-run 
growth despite the decay of the principality’s representative institutions. 
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